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FROM MASTER TO PAWN: CICERO’S INVOLVEMENT IN 
THE COLLAPSE OF REPUBLICAN ROME 
By Grady P. Moore
Rising in the 6th century B.C. from a collapsed kingship, the 
Roman Republic stood out as a democratic oddity in a world dominated 
by tyrannical monarchies. The subsequent five centuries saw the once 
unexceptional city-state grow extensively, first controlling the 
neighboring towns and regions, then the entire Italian peninsula, then 
finally the entire Mediterranean, with their borders stretching from 
Palestine to Normandy. Four hundred years after the birth of the 
republic, Cicero was born in the town of Arpinum, destined and 
determined to take up the mantle of Senator. Brilliant in oratory, cunning 
in the political sphere, and fiercely dedicated to republicanism, Cicero 
was the formidable force in Roman politics in the mid-first century B.C. 
However, though he sought to save the Roman Republic, Cicero’s 
arrogance and lack of tact in attempting to manipulate Octavian in the 
final years of his life led directly to his own demise, the birth of the 
empire and the destruction of his beloved Republic. 
Cicero was born in 109 B.C. to an equestrian family just north of 
Rome, in the town of Arpinum.1 Coming from a noble but non office-
holding line, Cicero was an outsider to the Roman political sphere. 
Typically, a lack of a familial history in Roman politics meant one would 
be excluded from a chance at a political career, but Cicero and his family 
maneuvered uniquely through marriages and alliances to create a 
network of social influence that opened the doors to the Roman Senate. 
Cicero’s father made a point of sending his children to Rome to be 
educated. Himself an invalid, this was perhaps his way of ensuring that 
his children would have a chance at the senatorial career from which he 
1 Plutarch, The Parallel Lives (Loeb Classical Library, 1919), 1.3. 
Tenor of Our Times 
202 
was restricted.2 Cicero, in spite of his relatively modest origins, never 
apologized for his humble beginnings. Plutarch records a dogged 
determination in the young lawyer to create a name for himself in spite 
of the odds against him. Upon being advised to change his cognomen to 
better his chances in Roman public life, Cicero is recorded to have 
laughed and boldly announced that he would carry the name Cicero 
(Latin for chick pea) to greater heights than the legendary names of the 
day.3 
Unlike most men of his day, however, his plans for greatness 
never involved any military success. From his earliest years until his 
demise, Cicero’s view on power and his own ability to wield it centered 
almost entirely around the field of persuasion. Being an intellectual at 
heart, Cicero was thoroughly averse to any sort of military involvement. 
It is unclear as to whether it was due to a lack of aptitude in the military 
arts or a distaste for blood or some other reason, but after serving as an 
aide to Pompeius Strabo during his teenage years, Cicero appears to have 
sworn away from military life. His early twenties show little to no 
military involvement.4 Instead, they were dominated by a passionate 
pursuit of academic and rhetorical excellence, skills he would rely on 
throughout his career. This preference for persuasion over force would 
be  a theme throughout his life, and is clearly seen in his actions during 
the Catiline Conspiracy and in the assassination of Julius Caesar. 
Cicero’s masterful grasp of oratory and rhetoric stemmed from 
an abundance of natural talent. Hailed by his contemporaries as a 
prodigy, he was compared by Plutarch to Plato, and was described as 
being “capable of welcoming all knowledge and incapable of slighting 
any kind of literature or training.”5 His talent propelled him to such 
2 Torsten Peterson, Cicero: A Biography (New York: Biblio and 
Tannen, 1963), 28-29. 
3 Plutarch, The Parallel Lives, 1.4-6. 
4 Thomas Wiederman, Cicero and the End of the Roman Republic 
(London: Bristol Classical Press, 1994), 24. 
5 Plutarch, The Parallel Lives, 2.3. 
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heights that the fathers of his schoolmates began to become jealous of 
him, as Cicero’s eloquence and intellect towered far above that of their 
sons. He was an especially gifted poet. Plutarch references a poem 
written by a juvenile Cicero that was apparently extant and relatively 
well-known some two centuries after Cicero’s death. Even in his own 
time he was relatively famous, being called the “best poet among the 
Romans” while still living.6 In addition to being extremely naturally 
gifted, Cicero benefited from the tutelage of his mentors, Lucius Crassus 
and Marcus Antonius. Known as two of the greatest orators of the 
generation preceding his, Crassus and Antonius are counted among 
Cicero's most impactful influences. Formally, Cicero was educated 
largely by Philon the Academic, disciple of Cleitomachus, who Plutarch 
describes as widely loved and admired by the Romans.7  
 Entering public life for the first time at the age of about twenty-
six, Cicero’s unique talent quickly propelled him to notoriety. He served 
as a lawyer, articulating arguments with such eloquence and grace that he 
immediately attracted the attention and respect of the intellectual class.8 
Cicero made his first significant splash in Roman politics with his 
defense of Roscius of Ameria. Roscius’ father had been put to death 
under proscription and his inheritance sold for a wildly discounted price 
to Chrysogonus, a freedman of Sulla, the then dictator of Rome. When 
Roscius publicly set forth the perceived injustice, accusing Sulla’s men 
of wrongdoing, Chrysogonus was indignant and arranged for Roscius to 
be accused of patricide on trumped-up evidence. 9 In his biography 
Cicero, W.K. Lacey explains that the prosecution thought that their 
proximity to Sulla rendered them invincible: in an era of proscriptions 
and dictatorship, few would dare to challenge the mighty tyrant. Cicero, 
however, had no such scruples. In spite of a ‘weak and reedy’ frame, he 
 
6 Plutarch, The Parallel Lives, 2.4-5 
7 Ibid 3.1 
8 W.K. Lacey, Cicero (New York: Harper and Row Inc., 1978), 14-15. 
9 Plutarch, The Parallel Lives. 3.4-6 
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brazenly attacked Chrysogonus, openly accusing his men of conspiracy 
and winning the freedom of Roscius.10 
Such an attack can be used as evidence against the commonly 
made claim that Cicero lacked courage and was unwilling to risk his own 
well-being. Plutarch describes this era as a time when “murders without 
number or limit filled the city,” and private hatred manifested itself in the 
outright killing of political rivals.11 In other words, it was not a safe time 
to be in the courtroom attacking the principle power-player of the city. 
But such boldness would come to characterize Cicero: his innate, 
idealistic belief in the law and in its divine supremacy guided his actions 
throughout his life, convincing him to take stances on the belief that the 
righteousness of his actions would see him through.12 
In his defense of Roscius, Cicero “speedily made himself a name 
by the mingled caution and boldness of his opposition to the dictator.”13 
It was no mistake either. Cicero had carefully planned out the nature of 
his entrance into public life. In an era in which the printing of speeches 
was relatively rare, Cicero made certain to produce a copy of his oration 
for consumption by the Roman public. Lacey comments on Cicero’s 
striking ambition apparent through this act, stating that the unambitious 
of the era did not take the time to write out their speeches for publication. 
Beyond that, he states that For Roscius was meant to be something of a 
manifesto, declaring the duty of the nobles in power to uphold 
governmental justice instead of abusing their position for personal and 
material gain.14 
10 Lacey, 15-16 
11 Plutarch, The Parallel Lives. 31.1 
12 Edward J. Swain, “Cicero’s Role in the Fall of the Roman Republic” 
(master’s thesis, San Diego State University)  21. http://sdsu-
dspace.calstate.edu/ (accessed April 13, 2018). 
13 Theodor Mommsen, The History of Rome, vol. 4 (Glencoe, IL: The 
Free Press and the Falcon’s Wing Press, n.d.), 482. 
14 Lacey, 15 
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In spite of his bravery in the courtroom, however, the threat of a 
vengeful Sulla was enough to convince the young lawyer that a hiatus in 
Athens would be beneficial. Citing his sickly frame and questionable 
health, he left for Athens in 79 B.C. to further his education and 
strengthen his body. He spent two years there, as well as in Asia Minor 
and Rhodes studying oratory and philosophy and learning from some of 
the most well-respected scholars in the Mediterranean world.15 By 77 
B.C. when an older and more educated Cicero returned to Rome to begin
his career in politics, the members of his aristocratic circle that had
guided and mentored him had all died. Crassus, Sacevola, and Antonius
had all either been murdered or passed away from old age, leaving
Cicero with few connections with which to start a political career. The
want of patrician connections among the non-elites had kept the Roman
Senate relatively pure of non-aristocratic members for a number of
centuries, consolidating power in a small circle of families. As a result,
few of the equites, Cicero’s class, ever made it to Senatorial status.16
Cicero, however, was not to be defeated by the restrictions of the 
class system. A lawyer of “ambition, talents, and self confidence”, he 
acquired a devoted following through concerted political maneuvering. 
He sought to befriend and assist as many as possible while offending and 
making enemies of few.17 He actively tried to avoid cases in which he 
would be the prosecutor, instead opting to act as a defense lawyer when 
given the opportunity. Men who had been defended, believed Cicero, 
were far more grateful than those who had used him as a means of attack. 
He even went so far as to attack the prominent orator Hortensius for 
“using his great talents to injure men and not, as formerly, to save 
them.”18 Such an approach helped him ascend the cursus honorum, the 
Roman political ladder, rather quickly, holding each magistracy at or 
15 Lacey, 17 
16 Petersson, 74. 
17 Ibid 33. 
18 Petersson, 74. 
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near the youngest possible age, including consul (the highest) at forty-
three.19 
Above anything else, the events of the Catiline Conspiracy were 
fundamental in Cicero’s development into both an avid enemy of the 
imperial system and a major player on the Roman political stage. The 
Catiline Conspiracy was the attempt of Lucius Catiline, a notable 
patrician and member of the Senate, to overthrow the Republic and 
establish himself as king. The episode is recorded extensively by Sallust, 
who describes Catiline as a psychopathic monster, reveling in civil war 
and destruction and capable of endless treachery.20 Making him all the 
more dangerous was the fact that he seems to have been almost 
superhumanly talented. Sallust 
tells of his abilities to “endure 
hunger, cold and want of sleep 
to an incredible degree”, and to 
carry on “of any form of 
pretense or concealment.”21 His 
charisma and wealth bought 
him a significant following 
among those similar to him 
both in spirit and plight. 
Catiline, who was deep in 
debt, preached a gospel of 
rebellion and absolution of 
debts to citizens in desperate 
19 Shrikant Yelegaonkar, Western Thinker's in Political Science, 
(Solapur, India: Laxmi Book Publication, 2009) 127. https://books.google.com. 
(accessed April 16, 2018). 
20 Sallust, The War with Catiline. Trans. Bill Thayer. (New York: Loeb 
Classical Library, 1921) http://penelope.uchicago.edu. (accessed April 12, 
2018). 3.1 
21 Ibid, 5.4. 
Cicerone Denuncia Catilina, meaning “Cicero 
denounces Catiline,” was painted by Cesare 
Maccari in 1889. The painting depicts Cicero 
accusing Catiline on the Senate floor of 
conspiracy to overthrow the consulship of 
Marcus Tullius Cicero and Gaius Antonus 
Hybrida. 
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financial straits. The problems of the indebted came in many cases from 
mismanagement of property granted after military service, while other 
issues stemmed from general irresponsibility, debauchery and pursuit of 
various vices at the expense of work. In addition, many of his following 
were just rebellious criminals who thought they would gain from seeing 
the system crumble. Sallust is harsh on the rebels, describing them as 
wantons, perjurers, gamesters and murderers.22 
Resentful and restless, the rebels-to-be were numerous and 
willing to sacrifice their lives at Catiline’s command. Catiline’s original 
plan had been to win the consulship and obtain absolute power from 
there, but his campaign for office was blocked by the efforts of Cicero 
and other Republicans who saw the malevolent goals of his scheme. The 
exposition of his ploy brought a nasty sequence for Rome and its 
citizens. Expelled from the city after a fiery declamation by Cicero to the 
Senate, Catiline was pushed out into northern Italy with his army. From 
there he concocted a scheme to simultaneously assassinate Cicero and 
burn the city, but his plan was foiled when his lieutenants were captured 
and executed. Discouraged by the setbacks, much of his following 
deserted, and he tried in vain to escape to Gaul. Becoming trapped 
between two legions, the affair was settled in a battle north of Rome in 
which Catiline and nearly all of his followers were slaughtered.23 
The effects of this near loss of the Republic had a significant 
impact on Cicero’s view of kingship. The success of Catiline’s operation 
almost certainly would have accelerated the decline of Rome, with 
Catiline essentially playing the role of self-indulgent psychopath that 
Nero and Caligula were to play later in the empire’s history, but in a 
much less stable setting. Fires would have burned down the city and 
hundreds of political opponents would have been murdered, with Cicero 
himself undoubtedly being among the first.24 This brief taste of civil war 
and potential tyranny, compounded with the bad experience the entire 
22 Sallust, 14.2. 
23 Sallust, 60.6. 
24 Sallust, 24.4. 
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Roman state had had under Sulla, who had killed many, set within Cicero 
an intense aversion to monarchy that would only increase throughout his 
life. 
However, the success of Cicero in this instance may ironically 
have been the seed of his downfall. Throughout his life, Cicero’s strategy 
was to dominate the political sphere, relying on subservient generals to 
carry out the government’s objectives. His associates in this approach 
varied based on the period; during his consulship (which contained the 
Cataline affair) it was Antonius, his fellow consul, who led the armies. 
There was a clear delegation of duties between the two leaders: Cicero 
would handle the majority of the lobbying and the senators, speaking to 
the assembly and managing the political aspects, while Antonius would 
be in charge of the army and its march against the rebels.25 Antonius’ 
character was well-suited for the partnership. According to Plutarch, 
Antonius was “a man who, of himself, would probably not take the lead 
either for good or for bad, but would add strength to another who took 
the lead,” making him perfect for such an alliance.26 In this situation, 
Cicero took the initiative and the duo helped save the Roman state. Such 
an approach to power, however, had its obvious risks. Cicero’s lack of 
hard power made him reliant on the good will and like-mindedness of the 
generals commanding the army. He could persuade and maneuver, but he 
had no concrete ability to carry out his objectives. It is likely that 
Cicero’s success with Antonius made him overconfident in his ability to 
manipulate armies from afar, leading to him underestimating the risks of 
his future partnership with Octavian. 
Another parallel appears when considering the fact that Antonius 
was thought to have some knowledge of Cataline’s plans. This bit of 
information is mentioned by Plutarch and Sallust, but it almost passes 
unnoticed, as though it is a trivial side note. However, it is clear that at 
25 Sallust, 36.3. 
26 Plutarch,The Parallel Lives, 11.1. 
Master to Pawn 
209 
the start of the affair, Antonius “knew about the conspiracy of Catiline 
and was not averse to it, owing to the magnitude of his debts.”27 This was 
the drawback of Cicero’s lack of hard power. Antonius joining with 
Cataline would have all but ensured the end of the republic, and Cicero 
with it. The gamble to trust Antonius was no doubt a highly calculated 
one: at that point the tide was clearly against Catiline and there would be 
little personal motive for treachery by Antonius. He was, after all, 
occupying the highest office in the land, and his debts, while significant, 
did not warrant such violence. The decision ended up functioning 
flawlessly and rescuing Rome, but Cicero’s reliance on the subservience 
of an associate holding the real power was risky and would eventually 
backfire.  
The next great threat to Cicero’s beloved Republic came in the 
form of Gaius Julius Caesar, a senator and highly successful general who 
became dictator after a bloody civil war, only to be assassinated by a 
coalition of some sixty senators. Caesar’s death was a rare case in which 
Cicero approved of political violence. He would ideologically 
acknowledge that justice should be “impartial, consistent, and firm” in all 
cases, including those calling for capital punishment, but at heart he was 
thoroughly a pacifist: imperfect peace was generally to be favored over 
justice-seeking wars.28 He also genuinely, deeply believed that “nothing 
is more destructive to governments, nothing is in such complete 
opposition to justice and law, nothing is less suitable for civilized men 
than the use of violence in a state which has a fixed and definite 
constitution.”29 Cicero consistently showed himself to be morally averse 
to civil war and bloodshed, even when it served his purposes. The reality 
27 Plutarch, The Parallel Lives, 12.3. 
28 Neal Wood, Cicero’s Social and Political Thought, (Berkeley: 
University of California, 1988), 57. 
29 Cicero, De Legibus, trans. Clinton Walker Keyes. Quoted in Edward 
Swain, “Cicero’s Role in the Fall of the Roman Republic.” (San Diego State 
University, 1977), 10. 
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of this can be seen in Cicero’s absence as a conspirator in Caesar’s 
murder. His omission from the conspiracy may not have been the result 
of ideological differences: Brutus and Cicero were close friends, sharing 
many of the same opinions and ideals.30 Perhaps, in their plotting, Brutus 
and Cassius (Caesar’s infamous murderers) were afraid that in spite of 
his deep opposition to Caesar and everything his reign stood for, Cicero’s 
pacifism would make him unsupportive of the murder. Their fears, 
however, were unfounded. After the murder, Cicero expressed a wish of 
having been included in the plot, and went so far as to say that Mark 
Antony, Caesar’s right hand man, should have been killed as well. 
Overall, however, Cicero was peace-loving, and his revulsion to violence 
was well known even in his own time. Indeed, in later life, upon being 
sent a statue of the god of war, he responded: "Why do you send me a 
statue of Mars? You know I am a pacifist!”31 
With Caesar gone, it appeared briefly as though the republican 
system that Cicero so loved was on its way back to preeminence in 
Rome. However, in the days and weeks following the assassination, the 
political climate would shift more and more in the favor of the Caesarian 
faction, led by Mark Antony. Antony had been Caesar’s right-hand man, 
so close that the conspirators had questioned whether or not murder him 
along with Caesar. He himself apparently feared such a threat, as upon 
hearing of the assassination of Caesar he donned Plebeian dress and fled 
into the streets. The liberatores, as the assassins called themselves, had 
decided against killing Antony on the moral grounds that only Caesar 
had been a tyrant. Soon, however, they were faced with the reality of 
Antony as Caesar’s successor in all but name.32 
30 Lily Ross Taylor, Party Politics in the Age of Caesar. (Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1949). 175-177. 
31 Michael Duncan, The History of Rome (New Zealand: Herodotus 
Press, 1963), Vol. 1, ed. 1. 28-29. 
32 Plutarch, Makers of Rome. Trans. Ian Scott-Kilvert, (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1965) 15.1-7. 
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Speaking at Caesar’s funeral, Antony had seized upon the 
sentiments of the people to incite a riot. At the podium he had held up the 
bloodstained toga worn by Caesar during his assassination and 
denounced the conspirators as murderers and villains.33 Inspired by the 
injustice of the deed and the tragedy of the loss of their champion, the 
mob responded by burning Caesar’s body and then proceeding to “attack 
the houses of his assassins.”34 The riot was the beginning of a massive 
surge of support for the Caesarian faction. Taking advantage of public 
sentiments, Antony used the legacy of Julius Caesar to propose and pass 
decrees on essentially whatever he desired. Entries from Caesar’s 
personal notebook were doctored to fit Antony’s agenda and as the lone 
consul his power among the Senate was essentially unchecked.35 
“Tyranny survives though the tyrant is dead,” said Cicero at the 
peak of Antony’s power.36 Lost and nearly powerless, the Republican 
faction of the Senate seemed doomed to an indefinite period of Antonian 
domination. Though his consulate was coming to an end and the 
upcoming consuls were unfriendly to him, Antony had arranged the 
appointment of himself as governor of Cisalpine Gaul, the adjacent 
northern province, where the distance and considerable legions. Due to 
his alienation of the Republicans while in office, Antony needed a way to 
safeguard against the possibility of a Ciceronian prosecution for his 
misconduct. The province would also provide a convenient excuse to 
build up forces he needed for continued domination of Rome. Under 
Caesar’s command, he had been scheduled to receive control of 
Macedonia, but he astutely saw that being so far from Rome would only 
allow his enemies to gain a foothold. In Cisalpine Gaul, on the other 
33 F.B. Marsh, Founding of the Roman Empire. (London, Oxford 
University Press, 1927) 166-167. 
34 Plutarch, Makers of Rome, 284 
35 Lacey, 143. 
36 Stewart Perowne, Death of the Roman Republic. (New York: 
Doubleday and Company, Inc. 1968). 236. 
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hand, he could maintain his army, his immunity and his influence on 
Rome as he awaited the coming events in the Republic.37 
Antony’s grand plan was complicated by Octavian’s arrival onto 
the scene in May 44 B.C. Scorning the advice of his mother and father-
in-law to renounce his claim to the inheritance, Octavian returned from 
his schooling in Macedonia to boldly claim the three-fourths of Caesar’s 
estate bequeathed to him in his will. From the beginning, Antony 
staunchly opposed Octavian and dismissed the young Caesar as an 
unimportant upstart.38 Octavian, however, was more capable than Antony 
believed. Inheriting the powerful name of Caesar, he went to work 
immediately putting his advantages to good use. He fulfilled the 
stipulations of his great-uncle’s will, distributing from his own pocket 
the seventy-five drachmas bequeathed to the people in Caesar’s will.39 
He also set about building up a network of support, both politically and 
militarily. Going with his uncle to Cicero, who at that time “commanded 
more influence than any other man in Rome,” Octavian offered that they 
form a sort of partnership.40 In it, Cicero would offer his eloquence and 
political influence while Octavian would give Cicero “the security to be 
derived from his wealth and his armed forces.”41 As can be seen by the 
arrangements of previous Ciceronian power structures, this sort of 
establishment was exactly the kind preferred by the elder statesman and 
the type in which he could do his best work. 
The intentions of Octavian at this moment are unclear. Whether 
or not he acted according to a master plan to use and then drop the old 
statesman will never be known, but it is clear that Cicero thought 
Octavian relatively dedicated to both him and the Republican way. He 
37 Eleanor Goltz Huzar, Marc Antony: A Biography. (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1978). 83. 
38 Plutarch, Makers of Rome. 16.4. 
39 Marsh, 173. 
40 Plutarch, Makers of Rome. 16.7. 
41 Plutarch, The Parallel Lives. 44.1. 
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also does not seem to have viewed as a threat of monarchical usurpation. 
Whether Octavian had an overarching plan or not, it is obvious that 
Cicero firmly believed that the young general was largely following 
Cicero’s directives. In a letter to Brutus, Cicero calls Octavian “a stream 
from the fountainhead of my policy,” indicating that he felt a genuine 
level of control over the young leader.42 Arrogance and vanity must have 
played a significant role in this opinion. It appears as though Octavian’s 
youth and lack of experience lulled Cicero into believing that he was not 
a threat, at least not a current one. Raised in the age of the Cursus 
Honorum in which no man could start a political career before the age of 
thirty, he may have just assumed that Octavian, who was not even 
twenty, would be disregarded as a political leader for the coming decade 
or so. While Octavian was indeed incredibly young, Cicero’s antiquated 
views on age and its restrictions for power blinded him to the true nature 
of Octavian’s ambitions. 
Cicero’s contribution to the Cicero-Octavian partnership came in 
a series of fiery speeches directed against Mark Antony called the 
Philippics. Named after the declamatory speeches by Demosthenes in his 
movement against Philip of Macedon, the Philippic speeches were 
delivered by Cicero from May 44-June 43 B.C. and are widely 
considered among the greatest speeches ever written. Pointed and fiery, 
they had an inflammatory effect on the situation. Harping upon Antony’s 
hostility and tyrannical actions, Cicero likened him to Catiline, Clodius 
and other criminals Cicero had dealt with in his career.43 The effect of 
the speeches were such that, at least nominally, the entire Senate turned 
against Antony. He was forced out of the city with his armies, intending 
on taking his appointed governorship in Cisalpine Gaul. However, the 
acting governor, Decimus Brutus, was not keen on giving up his post, 
42 Cicero, The Letters of Cicero. (London: George Bell and Sons, 
1900). 
43 M. Tullius Cicero, The Orations of Marcus Tullius Cicero. trans. 
C.D. Yonge. (London: George Bell and Sons, 1903.)
Tenor of Our Times 
214 
and Antony found himself cornered between the armies of Octavian and 
Decimus Brutus, as well as the forces of the consuls Pansa and Hirtius. 
The Battle of Mutina in April of 43 saw Antony nearly defeated 
and Octavian established as the de facto leader of the republican forces. 
However, with Antony no longer a threat to the republic, Octavian faced 
the daunting prospect of losing his armies, or worse, being charged as a 
criminal for raising an army without senatorial permission.44 Technically, 
Octavian risked being prosecuted for rebellion for raising and 
commanding an army without official consent. The senate “became 
afraid of a young man who had enjoyed such brilliant good fortune.”45 
Here he called on the influence of Cicero to help bolster his standing 
among the Republicans. To Cicero, the system they had established had 
functioned perfectly. The Republic was on its way to restoration, and 
Octavian seemed to be the perfect lieutenant, obediently managing 
military affairs while Cicero worked towards what he assumed were their 
shared political goals. Appealing to the Senate on Octavian’s behalf, he 
urged the aristocrats to allow Octavian to circumvent the age restrictions 
traditionally restricting young candidates seeking office. The debt owed 
for Octavian’s service, Cicero urged, outweighed the formalities that 
would prevent him for taking up the office. Convinced by the passionate 
urgings of such an august member, the senators were persuaded to grant 
Octavian these honors.46 
At the time of Octavian’s appointment as consul, it must have 
appeared to Cicero that the Republic once again had been saved from 
disaster. He had needed some help from the assassins of Julius Caesar 
and some tremendous assistance from this young Octavian, but the 
tranquil days of Republican glory seemed to be returning at last. The 
senate would convene, the consuls would oversee and the Roman world 
would return to the status quo. Ever proud, the man who had been named 
44 Marsh, 174. 
45 Plutarch, The Parallel Lives, 45.5. 
46 Plutarch, The Parallel Lives, 46.1. 
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Pater Patria must have felt he was fulfilling his duty to defend his 
country. 
Then, seemingly out of nowhere, Cicero’s idyllic plans were 
shaken to their core by the violent shock of betrayal. After initially 
allying with Republican forces to defeat Antony in northern Italy, 
Octavian spurned Cicero to unite with Lepidus and a floundering Antony 
in 43 B.C., creating the Second Triumvirate and effectively ending the 
Republic. The blow must have been intense for Cicero: in spite of all his 
hard work, the Republic had fallen. Among the first decrees of the all-
powerful trio was to proscribe over two hundred men in Rome, naming 
them enemies of the state. Overcoming Octavian’s reluctance, Antony 
demanded that Cicero be included in the proscriptions, and agreed to “no 
terms unless Cicero should be the first man to be put to death.”47 
Octavian fought this initially, but rather half-heartedly, seeing that the 
death of Cicero would be vital for the success of the Triumvirate.48 
Devastated at the betrayal, Cicero fled to the Italian coast in mourning. 
He faced a decision with fatal implications: flee to join Brutus and 
Cassius or return to test the mercies of Octavian. Unfortunately, he never 
got to choose. Paralyzed by his uncertainty, he was captured by the 
agents of Antony and murdered on December 7, 43 B.C. He was 73.49 
The legacy of Cicero’s interactions, wide reaching and 
ubiquitous, continues to ring throughout the western world. He 
revolutionized Latin literature and language, creating dozens of novel 
terms and forming a philosophical canon that became standard academic 
reading for the next two millennia. His oratorical skill has inspired 
speakers through the centuries, with his Philippics still being counted 
among the great speeches of history. However, perhaps his greatest 
47 Plutarch, The Parallel Lives. 46.3 
48 The exchange of proscriptions among the Triumvirate is recorded by 
Plutarch as being extremely cutthroat and utilitarian, with each member 
sacrificing allies in order to eliminate enemies. Lepidus, for example, allowed 
his brother to be included and Antony permitted that his uncle be killed. 
49 Ibid, 47.1-48.4. 
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influence on the world comes through the life and impact of his betrayer, 
Octavian. The Pax Romana, the spread of Christianity and the 
standardization of the Mediterranean world all stemmed from the power 
and rule of the emperor of Rome. Octavian’s continued political savvy, 
even-keeled decision making and remarkable ability to consolidate 
power guided Rome to an age unseen before and since, an era of 
prosperity and learning that may never be recreated. The greatness of 
Octavian was the greatness of Rome, and no one was more responsible 
for that than Cicero. 
Through era and eon, Cicero has remained enigmatic. Hailed 
among the greatest of orators, he is an icon of republicanism, of classical 
idealism and of ancient Rome. However, in one of the great ironies of 
history, it was the most famous advocate of republicanism that created 
the first Emperor of Rome. How did such a titan of democracy, and such 
a fervent enemy of tyranny, play such a crucial role in the creation of the 
world’s largest and most impactful dictatorship? The arrogance of 
Cicero, the view of the world as his pawn and the assumption that his 
senatorial wisdom and intellectual ability garnered him some sort of 
superiority led rise of the exact political structure he abhorred. In a 
dramatic turn of fate, the mightiest player of an era became a pawn and 
his erstwhile pawn became king. 
